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While the Administration's Treasury Department remains mum on the issue, the latest rate cut (to 2.0%) by the Federal Reserve tells the score loud and clear. And given the dollar's legacy position as a reserve asset currently being held throughout the world, these are the things that sudden financial crisis and hyperinflations are made of.
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.....Crude..Coal..NG
1967, 13.6, 18.7, 7.5
1968, 13.8, 19.4, 7.6
1969, 14.4, 21.1, 7.7
1970, 14.5, 28.1, 7.9
1971, 15.6, 34.0, 8.4
1972, 15.5, 36.2, 9.0
1973, 17.2, 40.8, 9.8
1974, 28.9, 62.2, 11.6
1975, 33.5, 72.2, 16.1
1976, 34.6, 68.9, 21.8
1977, 37.4, 72.8, 30.8
1978, 40.9, 80.4, 36.5
1979, 51.3, 84.3, 47.7
1980, 75.9, 87.4, 63.3
1981, 109.6, 93.0, 82.1
1982, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0
1983, 92.9, 100.5, 106.6
1984, 91.3, 102.2, 106.1
1985, 84.5, 102.2, 102.9
1986, 46.9, 100.8, 89.6
1987, 55.5, 97.1, 79.5
1988, 46.2, 95.4, 77.4
1989, 56.3, 95.5, 82.0
1990, 71.0, 97.5, 80.4
1991, 61.9, 97.2, 79.1
1992, 58.0, 95.0, 80.6
1993, 51.4, 96.1, 84.8
1994, 47.1, 96.7, 78.8
1995, 51.1, 95.0, 66.6
1996, 62.6, 94.5, 91.2
1997, 57.5, 96.3, 101.7
1998, 35.7, 93.6, 83.9
1999, 50.3, 90.7, 91.2
2000, 85.2, 88.0, 155.5
The Coal to oil price ratio (see below) had stayed at 1.3 and a bit through the whole of the 50s and 60s. It had jumped by 30% in 1970, and continued rising into 1973, to 2.4 relative to oil, or up 70%, making the "oil embargo" a total joke when you consider that the result was that in 1974 the price was the same in relative terms. This means that the oil price change then was a result of general conditions of increased demand for coal and simple monetary inflation. Obviously, the oil story is that you can't do an embargo on one country when the oil travels the world.
, Coal to Oil, NG to Oil
1967, 1.4, 0.5
1968, 1.4, 0.6
1969, 1.5, 0.5
1970, 1.9, 0.5
1971, 2.2, 0.5
1972, 2.3, 0.6
1973, 2.4, 0.6
1974, 2.2, 0.4
1975, 2.2, 0.5
1976, 2.0, 0.6
1977, 1.9, 0.8
1978, 2.0, 0.9
1979, 1.6, 0.9
1980, 1.2, 0.8
1981, 0.8, 0.7
1982, 1.0, 1.0
1983, 1.1, 1.1
1984, 1.1, 1.2
1985, 1.2, 1.2
1986, 2.1, 1.9
1987, 1.8, 1.4
1988, 2.1, 1.7
1989, 1.7, 1.5
1990, 1.4, 1.1
1991, 1.6, 1.3
1992, 1.6, 1.4
1993, 1.9, 1.6
1994, 2.1, 1.7
1995, 1.9, 1.3
1996, 1.5, 1.5
1997, 1.7, 1.8
1998, 2.6, 2.3
1999, 1.8, 1.8
2000, 1.0, 1.8
The appropriate level for coal to oil should still be around 1.4 1.5, and the only substantial departure was the coal spike of 69-73 to the coal side, and the aftermath of the Iranian revolution on the oil side, which revolution actually did cause a panic and raised oil prices (and "just in case" inventories) to absurd levels. The relative price of coal fell from 2 in 1978 to a low of 0.8 in 81, from whence the historic relationship resumed at about 1.6.
When compared to CPI, the relative price of coal to general goods went up 50% in 1970, and another 65% in 1974. Overall, coal prices rose 150% relative to general prices, rising more strongly than oil till the Iranian oil panic.
For economic impact purposes, it is useful to look at relative prices of these energy sources to the CPI:
, Crude, Coal, NG
1967, 0.14, 0.19, 0.07
1968, 0.13, 0.19, 0.07
1969, 0.13, 0.19, 0.07
1970, 0.12, 0.24, 0.07
1971, 0.13, 0.28, 0.07
1972, 0.12, 0.29, 0.07
1973, 0.13, 0.31, 0.07
1974, 0.20, 0.42, 0.08
1975, 0.21, 0.45, 0.10
1976, 0.20, 0.40, 0.13
1977, 0.21, 0.40, 0.17
1978, 0.21, 0.41, 0.19
1979, 0.24, 0.39, 0.22
1980, 0.31, 0.35, 0.26
1981, 0.40, 0.34, 0.30
1982, 0.35, 0.35, 0.35
1983, 0.31, 0.34, 0.36
1984, 0.29, 0.33, 0.34
1985, 0.26, 0.32, 0.32
1986, 0.14, 0.31, 0.27
1987, 0.16, 0.29, 0.23
1988, 0.13, 0.27, 0.22
1989, 0.15, 0.26, 0.22
1990, 0.18, 0.25, 0.21
1991, 0.15, 0.24, 0.19
1992, 0.14, 0.23, 0.19
1993, 0.12, 0.22, 0.20
1994, 0.11, 0.22, 0.18
1995, 0.11, 0.21, 0.15
1996, 0.13, 0.20, 0.19
1997, 0.12, 0.20, 0.21
1998, 0.07, 0.19, 0.17
1999, 0.10, 0.18, 0.18
2000, 0.17, 0.17, 0.30 (spike to 0.75)
The coal price stayed at about 0.2 throughout the 50s and 50s and oil at about 0.14-0.15. NG at 0.08 at a rather marginal use.
The Clean air act which made most of the coal (and sour oil) unburnable, caused a rise in the demand for cleaner coals, which became the whole of coal production. As a result of the coal shortage invented by congress, coal prices rose relative to everything else by 150% (peaked in 74 at 0.52), most of the rise within 1970 and then 1974. Oil rose in 1974 as a result of the "embargo" in part, but since coal prices rose too, it is more probably a matter of either general energy demand in this period, or that combined with simple inventory speculation driven by the monetary inflation of the time.
The actual oil shock was the Iran crisis that pushed relative crude prices to another double - even a double against coal. It was a panic driven by the Iranian disaster.
NG emerged as the cleaner and less capital intensive way to produce electricity, and followed coal up to reach a steady relative price, with Utils using the cheaper of the two according to market prices.
Over time, the coal shock receded to bring its price back in line with consumer goods prices as it was through the 50s and 60s. NG went through the same process outside of the price spike of last year. As we speak, oil fields are being redrilled for gas (and oil) all over the oil patch. Where the large oil companies left for deep water and the various Caspian fields, the small ones are drilling the old fields. Gas pipelines are on the way, and the result will be resumption of the old and consistent relationship.
The OPEC and political actions show up as substantially higher volatility in the relative price oil charts where the old ratio of oil prices to CPI has been re-attained, but volatility has never been quieted down, most notably because of OPEC decisions. The appropriate price for oil is ultimately in the consumer's hands. If oil prices are too high the consumer buys less. If too low, he buys more. The US consumer, as opposed to a German, French or Japanese, not to speak of Chinese and Koreans, is less sensitive to oil prices because it is a more minor portion of his expenses. Most notably that is because the American's production is higher than that of his counterparts elsewhere. Though much of this is imported productivity, the fact remains that the US trade relationship is roughly at equilibrium as exports are 80% of imports.
Since developing Asia must provide $100 billion in loan repayments every year, and the rest of the world has more than another $100 billion, at least the first $200 billion of the trade deficit are "pull" type rather than being pushed out of US monetary expansion. It is, therefore, structural, and there is little one can do to change it but to lower dollar indebtedness by debt to equity swaps and increased net exports by debtors. A few bankruptcies would help too, but too much "face" is lost when this happens, and many a favored crony with heavy guanxi may lose control of a politically sensitive company. And so we continue with the trade deficit, 1/2 of which is simply the result of business and governments in developing nations borrowing $2.5 trillion at 9-12% and trying to repay it by exporting the same products their neighbors are producing. Even the IMF stats show that some $200 bil a year simply evaporate in interest payments on international debt.
Chuck it to government imposed industrial policy that this has happened, joined with some Japanese inspired realy bad banking practices. (All of the Asian developing nations tried to follow the Japanese model, producing the same stuff Japanese were already producing, and playing "chicken" with each other as to who will stop construction of new plants before the market is glutted.)View Yesterday's Discussion.